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CIVIL PROCEDURE - WATER LAW AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court decision dismissing a petition for judicial review of the State 
Engineer’s ruling in a water rights action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
Disposition / Outcome 
 
The Court concluded that the NRS 533.450(1) does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the 
court of the county in which the applicant’s water rights are located. Rather, the statute 
contemplates multiple potential forums, the selection of which turns on the “location, nature, and 
origin of the interests allegedly affected.” Moreover, according to the Court, the general forum 
clause in NRS 553.450(1) does not address subject matter jurisdiction, but rather, venue.  The 
Court vacated the jurisdictional dismissal and remanded the case to the district court for 
determination of the motion to change venue. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
The present case arises from State Engineer Ruling 5823, which allocated groundwater 
rights in the Dayton Valley Hydrographic Basin (“the Basin”). The Basin is located wholly 
within Lyon County. 
Before the State Engineer, Appellants Churchill County and the Pyramid Lake Paiute 
Tribe (“the Tribe”) protested applications for groundwater appropriations, arguing that the Basin 
was “severely over-appropriated.” Specifically, the Appellants argued that due to the 
hydrological connection between the Basin’s groundwater and the surface waters of the Carson 
River, approval of the applications in Lyon County would deplete waters in which the Appellants 
have an interest in neighboring Churchill County.  Rejecting Appellants’ protests, the State 
Engineer granted all pending applications in Ruling 5823. 
Churchill County and the Tribe appealed the State Engineer’s decision, invoking NRS 
533.450(1), which provides in pertinent part: 
Any person feeling aggrieved by any order or decision of the State Engineer… 
affecting the person’s interests… may have the same reviewed by a proceeding 
for that purpose, insofar as may be in the nature of an appeal, which must be 
initiated in the proper court of the county in which the matters affected or a 
portion thereof are situated, but on stream systems where a decree of court has 
been entered, the action must be initiated in the court that entered the decree.
2
 
Reasoning that the “matters affected or a portion thereof” were located in Churchill County, 
Appellants filed their appeals in the Third Judicial District Court in Churchill County. In 
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  NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.450(1) (2007). 
addition, based on the clause of exception in NRS 533.450(1), the Tribe filed an appeal in the 
federal court that issued the decree governing use of Carson River water (“the Alpine decree”).3 
 In response to the Third Judicial District Court appeals, the State Engineer filed a motion 
to change venue.
4
 Additionally, Respondents Aspen Creek, LLC and Dayton Valley Investors, 
LLC (collectively, “Aspen Creek”) filed a motion to dismiss, to which several other Respondents 
joined, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 Citing NRS 533.450(1), both motions asserted that the Third Judicial District Court in 
Lyon County represented “the proper court of the county in which the matters affected or a 
portion thereof are situated,” as the applicant’s water rights are or would be located in Lyon 
County. Appellants Churchill County and the Tribe disagreed, arguing that the district court in 
either Churchill or Lyon County could hear the appeal because NRS 533.450(1) contemplates 
more than one possible forum. Moreover, according to appellants, the phrase “matters affected,” 
does not merely refer to an applicant’s interests, but rather, to the interests of a protestor as well.   
 Respondents asserted similar arguments before the Alpine decree court, seeking to 
dismiss the Tribe’s parallel federal appeal. Ruling before the Third Judicial District Court, the 
Alpine decree court rejected the Tribe’s argument that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the 
appeal under the clause of exception in NRS 533.450(1).
5
 According to the Alpine decree court, 
merely alleging that the State Engineer’s ruling affects federally decreed water rights is not 
sufficient to establish the decree court’s jurisdiction. Instead, the court determined that NRS 
533.450(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court where the applicant’s water rights are 
located. Thus, the Alpine decree court dismissed the Tribe’s appeal, finding that the district court 
in Lyon County had jurisdiction because the Basin is located in Lyon County. 
 Taking judicial notice of the Alpine 2008 order, the Third Judicial District Court in 
Churchill County agreed with the Alpine decree court, holding that the location of the applicant’s 
water rights determines which court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a State Engineer’s 
decision. As State Engineer Ruling 5823 granted or altered water rights of the applicants that are 
located in Lyon County, the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and dismissed 
both appeals.  Both Churchill County and the Tribe appealed. 
 In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Alpine 2008 order, basing 
its decision on United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co.
6
  The 2010 Orr Ditch decision held that 
where a protestor’s allegedly affected rights are federally decreed, the location of the applicant’s 
water rights is not determinative of jurisdiction. Instead, the court concluded that the clause of 
exception in NRS 533.450(1), providing for appellate review in the court that entered a decree, is 
implicated where the State Engineer allocates groundwater rights in a manner that allegedly 
diminishes the Tribe’s decreed water rights.   
 
Discussion 
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  600 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).   
On Appeal, the sole issue before the court was whether NRS 533.450(1) granted the 
Third Judicial District Court of Churchill County subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the 
appeals of Churchill County and the Tribe.  
 
Statutory Analysis 
 
First, the court considered the plain meaning of NRS 533.450(1). The statute begins with 
an introductory grant clause, which provides a right to judicial review to “any person feeling 
aggrieved by any order or decision of the State Engineer” where the order or decision “affect[s] 
the person’s interests.”7 The court determined the phrase “any person” to denote inclusiveness,8 
thereby conferring a right of judicial review to both applicants and protestors.
9
 
 Following the introductory grant of a right to judicial review, NRS 533.450(1) proceeds 
with a general forum clause – a judicial review proceeding “must be initiated in the proper court 
of the county in which the matters affected or a portion thereof are situated.”10 According to the 
Court, while the word “must” is mandatory, indicating that a judicial review proceeding must be 
initiated in the proper forum, it does not follow that the clause signifies (1) that a given 
proceeding must occur in a single court in a single county or (2) that the phrase “matters 
affected” only contemplates the interests of an applicant. Rather, the phrase “or a portion 
thereof” suggests multiple potential forums. Moreover, accepting the proposition that multiple 
iterations of the same word in the same statute have the same meaning,
11
 the Court determined 
that use of the word “affect” in both the introductory grant clause and the forum clause indicates 
that the phrase “matters affected” refers to the interests of applicants and protestors alike.   
 Finally, NRS 533.450(1) includes a clause of exception – “but on stream systems where a 
decree of court has been entered, the action must be initiated in the court that entered the 
decree.”12  The Court concluded that the clause of exception reinforces the proposition that NRS 
533.450(1) contemplates multiple potential forums – here, the decree court and the non-decree 
court.   
 As such, the Court held that NRS 533.450(1) does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the 
court of the county in which the applicant’s water rights are located, but rather, contemplates 
multiple potential forums the selection of which turns on the “location, nature, and origin of the 
interests allegedly affected.”13 
 
 The Third Judicial District Court Decision and Ninth Circuit Precedent  
 
Basing its decision on the later-vacated order of the Alpine decree court, the Third 
Judicial District Court in Churchill County determined that the language of NRS 533.450(1) was 
ambiguous, and that a literal reading of the statute produced an unreasonable result. The district 
court reasoned that the legislature intended NRS 533.450(1), through the clause of exception, to 
confer exclusive jurisdiction to a decree court where a State Engineer’s decision affects water 
rights on decreed stream systems. According to the district court, absent this reading, a single 
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decision could implicate interests relating to two different stream systems for which two 
different courts have entered decrees. Based on the above consideration, the district court 
concluded that accomplishing exclusive jurisdiction, requires courts to limit the phrase “matters 
affected” to encompass the water rights of the applicant. 
 Here, the Court concluded that limiting jurisdiction to the court of the county in which 
the applicant’s water rights are located would also create problems associated with multiple 
potential forums. Moreover, such a limitation on jurisdiction would create a conflict between the 
ongoing jurisdiction of a decree court and a second court’s assumed jurisdiction. According to 
the Court, this is precisely the type of conflict that the legislature designed the clause of 
exception in NRS 533.450(1) to mitigate.   
 To illustrate the problem, the Court turned to the Orr Ditch decision, which held that a 
decree court has jurisdiction over an appeal where a State Engineer’s order or decision affects a 
protestor’s senior, federally decreed rights.14  However, the decree court’s jurisdiction is limited 
to an assessment of the affect of the State Engineer’s decision on the senior, federally decreed 
rights, and if necessary, an order directing the State Engineer to correct any adverse affect. 
Where an appeal implicates state decreed rights, according to the Orr Ditch court, the general 
forum clause of NRS 533.450(1) governs jurisdiction. 
 While Orr Ditch primarily considered the jurisdiction of a federal decree court, the Court 
determined that the district court’s decision that jurisdiction turns on the location of an 
applicant’s water rights was inconsistent with Orr Ditch. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
Orr Ditch in Alpine Land and Reservoir Co., vacating the parallel decision of the Alpine Decree 
court.
15
  Concluding that the Ninth Circuit’s precedent represented persuasive authority, the 
Court rejected the district court’s interpretation of NRS 533.450(1) both due to the conflict it 
created with Orr Ditch and within the statute itself. 
 
 Prior Nevada Supreme Court Precedent 
 
 Having determined that the location of an applicant’s water rights is not determinative of 
subject matter jurisdiction under NRS 533.450(1), the Court considered whether its holding is 
consistent with Jahn v. District Court.
16
  In Jahn, The Court held that the remedy provided by 
section 75 (now NRS 533.450(1)) was exclusive, and that HLILP could not rely on section 36½ 
(now NRS 533.330(1)) or the inherent powers of the decree court to compel the State Engineer 
to act as demanded. Thereafter, the Court recited the forum clause of section 75 (NRS 
533.450(1)), and indicated that as the “matters affected” were located in Pershing County, the 
district court in Humboldt County lacked jurisdiction. In the present case, the Court concluded 
that the statement regarding jurisdiction was dictum. Moreover, the statement could not assist 
Respondents, as all relevant water rights in Jahn were located solely in Pershing County. 
 
 Venue 
 
Finally, the Court acknowledged both the general principle that jurisdiction over a single 
interrelated system of water rights should be vested in a single court, and the practical difficulties 
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associated with multiple courts exercising jurisdiction over such a system.
17
 However, the Court 
concluded that the general principle does not represent an inviolable rule.
18
  Moreover, the Court 
reasoned that the practical difficulties that arise where multiple courts exercise jurisdiction over 
an interrelated system of water rights are diminished if one recognizes the general forum clause 
in NRS 533.450(1) as addressing venue rather than subject matter jurisdiction. The Court then 
compared procedures specified in various statutes to the general forum clause to demonstrate that 
NRS 533.450(1) addresses venue. Additionally, the Court acknowledged that reading the general 
forum clause in NRS 533.450(1) as establishing venue is consistent with the position of the State 
Engineer,
19
 which in the context of a water law statute, represents persuasive authority. 
However, the Court remanded to the district court for determination of venue, due to an 
incomplete record and lack of a district court decision addressing venue.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court concluded that NRS 533.450(1) does not limit jurisdiction according to the 
location of an applicant’s water rights. Rather, the phrase “matters affected” in the general forum 
clause of NRS 553.450(1) refers to the interests of applicants and protestors alike. Moreover, 
according to the Court, the general forum clause of NRS 533.450(1) does not address subject 
matter jurisdiction, but rather, venue. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court’s 
jurisdictional dismissal, and remanded the case for determination of the State Engineer’s motion 
for a change of venue. 
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